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ABSTRACT:  Natural languages can express some logical propositions that humans 
are able to understand. We illustrate this fact with a famous text that Conan Doyle 
attributed to Holmes: “It is an old maxim of mine that when you have excluded the 
impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth”. This is a subtle 
logical statement usually felt as an evident truth. The problem we are trying to solve 
is the cognitive reason for such a feeling. We postulate here that we accept Holmes’ 
maxim as true because our adult brains are equipped with neural modules that 
naturally perform modal logical computations.  
Keywords: Neural computations; Natural language; Models of reasoning; Modal 
logics  
 
 
 
 
* Previous version in arXiv: 
 “The neural computation of Sherlock Holmes' old maxim” 
 
 2 
1. Introduction      
Human language is used to express logical and mathematical computations whose 
cognitive bases still remain unexplained. We ask ourselves if language acquisition 
involves a kind of implicit logical and mathematical programming that could explain 
such performances.  Examples of these performances are some logical propositions, 
transferred by natural language, valid for different languages and for large 
populations of humans sharing similar cultural traditions. In the present work we 
choose –as a largely accepted logical statement– one of the most cited expressions 
that Arthur Conan Doyle attributed to Sherlock Holmes, the “old maxim” mentioned 
by the character in the story “The Adventure of the Beryl Coronet”. For an allusion to 
this maxim in a scientific context see Cairns-Smith (1990). We enunciate different 
versions of this “old maxim”, and the reader can explore by himself the origin of the 
conviction that these expressions usually provoke (see Doyle 1988). This maxim is a 
subtle logical statement and the interesting (and even astonishing) point is that 
many readers feel that this maxim is an evident truth. One problem we are trying to 
explain is the following: which is the cognitive reason for such a feeling?  The 
method we follow here implies to keep the theories as simple as possible. We avoid 
in this first approach the temptation to deeply expand Bayesian theories, logical 
formalisms or the mathematical technicalities of neural models. Our aim is to 
explore the possibility of establishing an acceptable link between very different 
disciplines that are, however, all connected with our problem.  
 
Perhaps the most important question about the “old maxim” concerns the 
consistency of the statement. At the same time, the most enigmatic aspect of this 
maxim is the natural acceptability triggered by it in our mind. We are going to 
analyze two approaches to consistency: the logical consistency and the 
“neurocomputational consistency”. We propose to accept the logical consistency 
whenever the statement can be immersed in normal well-formed formulas of basic 
propositional and modal logic. In addition, we propose to accept the 
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neurocomputational acceptability if the logical computation of the statement can be 
executed by a neural network model.  In this work we intend to show that both 
consistency conditions are satisfied. We begin by describing a Bayesian approach to 
the maxim. Then, we provide a logical framework to Holmes’ statement. After this, 
we show how these logical approaches can be computed in model neural modules 
capable to integrate modular networks (ie. networks of networks) that execute a 
variety of logical operations. With these purposes, we begin describing some basic 
concepts of propositional calculus and modal logic that confer the logical support of 
Holmes’ maxim.  Then, we present a kind of modular neural model based on matrix 
algebra, and describe how logic operations can be very naturally incorporated into 
these matrix modules. Finally, we put together this material to provide a neural 
model that is capable to represent Holmes’ maxim. This approach allows us to 
propose an explanation of the reason why the Holmes’ maxim seems so naturally 
acceptable by us. Our explanation is based on modeling some particular neural 
networks capable of representing the cognitive computation of modalities. 
 
2. Holmes’ Old Maxim 
Perhaps the most cited version is the following: “It is an old maxim of mine that when 
you have excluded the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the 
truth” (in Appendix 1 we present three versions of this maxim with the 
corresponding sources). In the articles compiled by Eco and Sebeok (1988) there are 
many allusions to these texts, as well as some formalizations of the methods 
attributed by Conan Doyle to Holmes using techniques coming from mathematical 
logic.  
 
The involvement of probability in this text invites us to approach the meaning of 
these statements using a naïve Bayesian description. In this context, the probability 
)B|A(P i  of iA  being the cause of event B is given by  
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where it is assumed that the set { }n1 A,,A …  includes disjoint events susceptible of 
being interpreted as causes of the event B (eg. B can be a symptom of a disease and 
{ }n1 A,,A … the set of potential pathological agents).  Each )A|B(P j  measures the 
conditional probability of event B given jA , and each  )A(P j  measures (or 
estimates) the a priori probability of event jA .  
 
In this Bayesian framework, Holmes’ maxim can be interpreted as follows: after a 
research process the investigator can establish that for all ij ≠  0)A|B(P j → : As a 
consequence, only 0)A|B(P i ≠  .  Hence, at this stage, Bayes’ formula adopts the 
following aspect: 
 
P(B | A )P(A )i iP(A | B)i 0 P(B | A )P(A ) 0i i
≈
+ + + +⋯ ⋯
                (2) 
 
Consequently, 1)B|A(P i →  independently of the value of the a priori 
probability )A(P i . This deliberately simplified Bayesian approach gives us a good 
insight into the meaning of Holmes’ maxim. 
 
It is important to remark that, together with allusions to probability, Holmes’ maxim 
includes the words “impossible” and “truth”. These two words point to a logical 
framework, and particularly “impossible” leads us to the domain of modal logic.  
Consequently, we are going to assume that understanding our cognitive acceptation 
of the maxim requires to start from logic, and to include a posteriori a probabilistic 
argument inside the logical frame. Moreover, we need to include this logical frame 
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inside a neural model in order to explore how a biological device such as the brain 
could become prone to accept the validity of Holmes’ maxim. We introduce the 
neural modeling framework in Section 4.1 and the probabilistic approach returns in 
Section 4.3.  
 
3. Logical Consistency 
Some of the fundamental ideas about modal logic were exposed by Aristotle in his 
short text “On Interpretation” (Aristotle, around 350 BC, edition E.M. Edghill). The 
two basic modal operators “possibility” and “necessity” are formally related by a 
postulate clearly stated by Aristotle. We provide here with a version of this postulate 
(Aristotle, 350 BC, Chapter 13):  
 
“It remains, therefore, that the proposition ‘it is not necessary that it should not be’ 
follows from the proposition ‘it may be’ ”. 
 
A modern formalization of modal logic can be found in Hugues and Cresswell 1972. 
The symbolic representation for the previous postulate is the following,  
 
( )(Q) Q◊ ≡ ¬ ¬  □                                      (3) 
 
where ◊ represents the modal proposition “It is possible”, □  means “It is necessary”, 
¬  is the negation, and ≡  represents the logical equivalence. Q represents any 
proposition. 
 
An equivalent representation is 
 
( )(Q) Q≡ ¬◊ ¬  □                                        (4) 
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A corollary, based on the fact that the double negation corresponds to an 
affirmation, is 
 
[ ] ( )(Q) Q¬ ◊ ≡ ¬  □                                        (5) 
 
Note that if Q is an arbitrary proposition, its negation ( )Q¬  can be interpreted as 
“whatever remains” once excluded Q. Hence, this corollary (5) shows the proximity 
of Aristotle’s postulate with Holmes’ maxim: If it is true that Q is impossible, it is 
true that what remains, ( )Q¬ , is necessary.  
 
Remark that the equivalences (3), (4) and (5) are true in all cases, notwithstanding 
the truth-value of the modal evaluations of Q (i.e., both members of the equivalence 
can be false).  The relation with Holmes’ maxim restricts to the case in which both 
members of the equivalence are true.  
 
The works of De Morgan, Gregory, Boole and Peirce, among others, were 
fundamental to transform logic into a discipline susceptible of being supported by 
the techniques of mathematics. Their work produced a variety of mathematical 
representations of logical calculus. We note here that, deeply influenced by the 
symbolic methods developed in the field of differential equations (his main area of 
expertise), Boole established the basic conditions that allow to map the logic truth-
values on mathematical variables and to transform the logical statements in 
mathematical functions (Boole 1847, 1854). In addition, in his book “The Laws of 
Thought” (1854) Boole attempted to link logical procedures with probability theory. 
From this Boolean approach, it was possible to define functional relations for all the 
fundamental logical operations (e.g., negation, disjunction, conjunction, implication, 
exclusive-or, equivalence).  
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When logic is immersed into this “Boole’s Universe” (BU), the truth-values define a 
set  
 
{ }2 t , fτ =   
 
where t and f are abstract (even arbitrary) mathematical objects corresponding to 
the truth-values “true” and “false” respectively. In this BU, the monadic functions 
Mon are applications  
 
2 2Mon : τ →τ  
 
(the negation Not  is an example of these monadic functions, being Not (t) = f and 
Not (f) = t). The dyadic functions Dyad are applications 
 
2 2 2Dyad : τ ×τ →τ  ; 
 
where the symbol ×  indicates the Cartesian product. The truth tables used to 
represent the logical operations (e.g. disjunction or implication) are examples of the 
use of these dyadic mappings. 
 
Following the methods created by Boole, other researchers tried to represent modal 
operations as mathematical functions. Nevertheless, in a famous work Łukasiewicz 
(1930) demonstrated the impossibility to represent “possibility” and “necessity” as 
mathematical functions inside the two-valued logic defined in BU (for details, see 
Łukasiewicz 1930, Mizraji 2008). Consequently, the search for truth-functional 
representations for these logical modalities leads Łukasiewicz to extend the truth-
value space by adding a third value “u” corresponding to uncertain or undecidable 
propositions. In this new Łukasiewicz’s Universe (LU), the logical monadic and 
dyadic functions are built up over the set  
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{ }3 t, f , uτ =   
 
where   
 
3 3Mon : τ →τ  
 
and 
 
3 3 3Dyad : τ ×τ →τ  . 
 
Inside this LU, the classical modalities become monadic logical functions, and 
“possibility” and “necessity” can be respectively expressed by the functions 
possibility ( )x◊  and necessity ( )x□ , 3x τ∈ , defined as follows:   
 
( ) ( ) ( )t u t ; f f◊ ≡ ◊ ≡ ◊ =   
( ) ( ) ( )t t ; u f f≡ ≡ ≡□ □ □    , 
 
The negation is defined in the LU as follows: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )t f ; u u ; f t¬ ≡ ¬ ≡ ¬ ≡  . 
 
With this formal repertoire, we can represent Aristotle’s postulate with a truth-
functional equivalence: 
 
[ ] ( )x(Q) x(Q)◊ ≡ ¬ ¬  □                                  (6) 
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where 3)Q(x τ∈  is the truth-value corresponding to an abstract proposition Q. 
Equation (6) transforms the Aristotelian postulate into a theorem. Being the 
negation ¬  an idempotent operator  [ ]( )(x) x¬ ¬ ≡ , we can deduce the following 
equivalence from (6) : 
 
[ ] ( )x(Q) x(Q)¬ ◊ ≡ ¬      □                       (7)        
 
We are going to assume the following Axiom:  
 
AXIOM :   ( ) ( )x(Q) x Negation Q¬ ≡  ; 
 
Observe that, in this truth-functional format, our logical operators apply only to 
truth-values; instead “Negation Q” designates the negation of a proposition. For 
instance, the truth-value of Q = “3 is an even number” is f and its negation is t; the 
truth-value of Negation Q = “3 is not an even number” is t; “Negation Q” is not a 
mathematical variable but a proposition and can be considered as a propositional 
definition of negation. This Axiom can be proved as a Lemma (Mizraji and Lin 2011) 
if we consider that Q refers to a category W (a set) of propositions, and that the 
proposition is true if Q belongs to this category and false if it belongs to the negation 
of this category (the complement of the set W). 
 
Using this Axiom, the logical equivalence (7) can be transformed as follows: 
 
 [ ] ( )x(Q) x Negation Q¬ ◊ ≡      □                        (8)     
 
If it is verified that 
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[ ]x(Q) t¬ ◊ ≡                                                                 (9)         
 
then the equivalences (7) or (8) can be considered as partial mathematical models of 
Holmes’ statement. In fact, this mathematical result seems too simple because 
equivalence (9), due to Łukasiewicz functional definitions of negation ¬   and 
possibility ◊ , implies that [ ]x(Q) f◊ ≡  and, hence, that x(Q) = f. Does this excessive 
simplicity disqualify the usefulness of the logical model? If one considers that the 
problem for Holmes is to develop a research process able to abolish uncertainty, the 
answer is negative because the statement x(Q) = f  represents the success of such 
process. In fact, the introduction of the third truth-value in Łukasiewicz logic was 
essential to guide the neural modeling of modal logic. As we are going to see in the 
next Section, modalities can be computed in the matrix neural models using two 
different ways to represent the uncertain truth-value in the network: on the one 
hand, defining a specific “truth-vector” to characterize uncertain truth-values 
(Section 4.2), and on the other, as a probabilistic weighting of the “true” and “false” 
vectors (Section 4.3). 
 
The modal formats previously established are extremely important for the 
interpretation of Holmes’ maxim, but they do not solve our problem because they do 
not constitute cognitive models and probabilities are absent. However, the modal 
relation (5) and the corresponding truth-valued representations (7) to (9) give us a 
powerful formal construction that shares with Holmes’ postulate the enigmatic 
“feeling” of correctness that it produces. In fact, this formalism is a fundamental link 
to connect these modal equivalences with mathematical models of logical operations 
derived from neural models. Consequently, this approach covers some logical 
aspects of the statement, but a more comprehensive modeling should include the 
following points: a) a connection with the neural structures that produce and decode 
Holmes’ maxim, and b) a link with probability concepts. As we are going to show in 
 11 
the next Section, matrix algebra is a fundamental framework for the construction of 
these models.  
 
4. A neural approach to logic computations 
The human brain is a spontaneous, pre-theoretical, computing device capable of 
performing sophisticated information processing, including mathematical and 
geometrical calculations. It is “pre-theoretical” in the sense that the human brains 
display many computational performances with no need of any explicitly 
programmed procedures or techniques. Clearly, language is used to express logical 
and mathematical computations whose cognitive bases still remain unexplained. We 
can ask ourselves if language acquisition involves a kind of implicit logical and 
mathematical programming that could explain such performances. 
 
It is a common experience that the brain can solve problems concerning visual 
patterns without using any pre-existing mathematical knowledge. These problems 
are usually stated verbally. To illustrate this point, we can consider the image of 
Figure 1 representing a road.  
 
Figure 1. The points A and B over the design of a curved road have very different 
curvatures.  
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If you ask adults in which zone, A or B, the road shows larger curvature, the majority 
of the answers indicate point B. Of course, this conclusion is not based on the use of 
the classical mathematical formula  
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that gives the curvature of point (x, y) in a plane trajectory with Cartesian equation 
y(x). On the contrary, almost surely this equation was strongly inspired by the pre-
existing cognitive notion of curvature. 
 
Logical judgments usually integrate the repertoire of human cognition, and even if 
many human actions are not submitted to the logic, the logical procedures are used 
for some crucial tasks that involve rational decisions. Consequently, it is particularly 
relevant to investigate the relation between cognitive models and logical 
performances (for an analysis of this point, see Binazzi 2012).  
 
It is important to note that the three-valued logic, defined in Section 3, assumes the 
existence of well pre-classified data according to three cognitive categories: true, 
false, uncertain. The possibility of this classification is the consequence of clear 
diagnoses about the nature of the facts (e.g.: due to the lack of documents some 
historical facts can be transitorily classified in these three categories). But an open 
and evolving inquiry is full of transitory conjectures. In this situation, a sharp 
classification is not possible and the investigators must explore actual facts and build 
up their conclusions trying to decide if the conjectures are true or false in an 
environment full of uncertainties. In fact, this is the normal situation for many of the 
decisions adopted by humans in their natural environments.  
 
4.1 Matrix Associative Memories 
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Many different approaches have been proposed to describe different aspects of 
neural function (Arbib 1995). In particular, the relations between brain dynamics 
and linguistic processes have been the subject of important investigations (see, for 
instance, Blutner 2004, beim Graben 2008). Let us mention the importance of 
matrices in the development of the theory of neural associative memories, a theory 
mainly developed around 1970 (Anderson 1972, Kohonen 1972, Cooper 1974). The 
matrix associative memories are able to model important facts about biological 
memories established in many experimental and clinical investigations. 
Comprehensive descriptions of this theory are included in Kohonen (1977) and 
Anderson (1995). These matrix memories are considered “distributed memories” 
because the residence of the information is a large set of synaptic contacts between 
neurons. This information is scattered and partitioned prior to be stored. This fact 
produces a desirable robustness of the model, in the sense that stored data can 
persist even in the presence of damages that produce a loss of neurons or synapses; 
this robustness of the model is a desirable fact because biology had revealed the 
existence of a relative tolerance to damage in real memories (Anderson 1995). 
 
This theory assumes that the cognitive patterns correspond to neural activities that 
map on large dimensional vectors. A memory is a matrix that associates pairs of 
column vectors )f,g( ii , i = 1,2, …, K, where if  corresponds to the pattern i that 
enters the memory (e.g. the image of a person), and ig  is the associated output (e.g., 
a name associated with the input image). As the theory shows, these vectors are 
composed by the electrochemical signals used by neurons to code information; these 
signals are generated in parallel by thousands of firing axons (Anderson 1995). The 
simplest form of the matrix that stores those pairs of vectors is as follows: 
 
∑
=
=
K
1i
T
ii fgA      .                                                                        (10) 
 
 14 
(the superindex T indicates transposition). Usually it is assumed that the set of 
stored input vectors is orthonormal (i.e. the if  are orthogonal between them and 
with lengths equal one). This assumption implies that the similarity between 
patterns is measured by the angle (equal patterns are parallel and completely 
different patterns are orthogonal). When a pattern kf  enters the memory A, it is 
processed and generates an output. The following equation illustrates the 
mechanism: 
 
∑
=
=
K
1i
ikik gf,ffA                                                                     (11) 
 
where k
T
iki fff,f =  is the scalar product (an operation that directly produces the 
cosines of the angle between this multidimensional unitary vectors; this cosines 
measure  the angle and, consequently, the similarity between the patterns). If the 
input pattern belongs to the set stored into the memory, i.e. { }ik ff ∈  , we have 
 
kk gfA =  ,                                                                                    (12) 
 
a perfect association.  
 
To include semantic contexts in the framework of this theory, different approaches 
involving a complex integration between inputs and contexts have been proposed 
(Arbib 1995). One of these approaches (Mizraji and Lin 2011) uses the Kronecker 
product to integrate inputs and contexts. In this framework, the matrix memory can 
be expressed as  
 
T
ij i j
i, j
M g (f p )= ⊗∑                                                           (13) 
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where jp  is the context associated with the input if , and  ijg  is the output 
associated with the contextualized input. The symbol ⊗  represents the Kronecker 
(or tensor) product; in Appendix 2 we describe the basic properties of this operation 
(we use this tensor product inside a neural model, but for a foundation of this 
operation based on cognitive science see Smolensky 1990). 
 
According to the algebraic rules involved in matrix algebra and Kronecker products 
(Graham 1981), the response of matrix memory M in the presence of an input and its 
context is  
 
ijhj
j,i
kihk gp,pf,f)pf(M ∑=⊗                                         (14) 
 
with exact associations if the sets { }if  and  { }jp  are orthonormal, and if  { }ik ff ∈  
and { }jh pp ∈ .  
 
If matrix memories (10) and (13) represent biological associative memory modules, 
they are usually rectangular matrices of large dimensionality.  
 
4.2 A Matrix-Vector Logic 
The neural models previously described, provide us with a simple and powerful way 
to represent a large variety of logical operations1. Based on these memory modules, 
some years ago a matrix formalism named ‘vector logic’, that connects elementary 
propositional and modal logics with matrix neural models, was developed (see, for 
instance, Mizraji 2008).  Inside this neural theory, the logical gates map on matrices 
                                                 
1
 For an historical account of the links between logical theory and neural models see 
Eduardo Mizraji (2013) En Busca de las Leyes del Pensamiento (Second Edition), 
Montevideo: Trilce-Dirac.  
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and the truth values on vectors. The procedure to create the maps begins by 
mapping the truth values on orthogonal unitary vectors. Inside this neural 
formalism, the number of vector truth-values is a priori only limited by the 
dimensionality of the neural vectors. A large variety of many-valued logics can in 
principle be developed and sustained by matrix memory modules, because normally 
it is biologically plausible to assume that a neural vector has hundreds or thousands 
of components (Anderson 1995). In what follows, we describe two- and three-valued 
matrix-vector logics. In Section 4.3 we are going to show how a translation of the 
classical neural representation of modalities described by McCulloch-Pitts (1943) 
neuronal circuits can be adapted to produce an infinite-valued logic from two truth 
values and probabilistic weights. 
 
Thus, a two-valued logic requires mapping st֏  and nf֏ , with s and n being 
orthonormal q-dimensional vectors; hence { }n,s2 =τ . Using this vector 
representation for the truth-values, the monadic and the dyadic two-valued gates 
respectively become the functions  
 
22:)2(Mon τ→τ    ,                                                           
222:)2(Dyad τ→τ×τ     .                                                   
 
A three-valued logic is defined over the vector set  { }h,n,s3 =τ , where h is a q-
dimensional normal vector (orthogonal to vectors s and n) corresponding to the 
uncertain truth-value u ( hu֏ ). This vector set allows building up matrix versions 
for monadic and dyadic three-valued logical operators: 
 
33:)3(Mon τ→τ        ,                                                      
333:)3(Dyad τ→τ×τ   .                                                 
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As simple examples of Mon(2) we have the following matrices, 2I  and 2N  , that 
correspond in this matrix framework to the logical two-valued Identity and Negation 
¬  : 
 
TT
2 nnssI +=    ,                                                                            (15) 
TT
2 snnsN += .                                                                             (16) 
 
Important examples of Dyad(2) operators are the matrix conjunction 2C  and 
disjunction 2D , given by the expressions: 
 
TTTT
2 )nn(n)sn(n)ns(n)ss(sC ⊗+⊗+⊗+⊗=     ,               (17) 
TTTT
2 )nn(n)sn(s)ns(s)ss(sD ⊗+⊗+⊗+⊗=    .                 (18) 
 
Using these equations it can be easily proved that these operators execute vector 
versions of the classical operations. For instance,  
 
s)ss(C2 =⊗ ;    n)nn(C)sn(C)ns(C 222 =⊗=⊗=⊗ . 
 
It is important to see that the monadic operators (15) and (16) are particular cases of 
memory modules (10), and that the dyadic operators (17) and (18) correspond to 
memory modules (13). The vector logic provides explicit expressions for some of the 
Mon(3) and Dyad(3) matrix operators. We mention the fact that, under this 
formalism, the modalities possibility and necessity become very simple monadic 
matrices (a consequence of the Łukasiewicz functional definitions described in 
Section 3). Thus, for the three-valued vector system of logic, the identity 3I , the 
negation 3N , the matrix Pos (that represents in this formalism the possibility ◊ ) 
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and the  matrix Nec (that represents the necessity □ ) can be expressed by the 
following simple formulas: 
 
T
23 hhII += ,                                                                             (19) 
T
23 hhNN += ,                                                                          (20) 
T
2 shIPos +=  ,                                                                         (21) 
T
2 nhINec += ,                                                                         (22) 
 
where 2I  and 2N  are the operators given by equations (15) and (16)  
 
Inside this matrix formalism, some basic theorems on logical modalities can be 
expressed as vector-matrix equalities. For instance, the postulate expressed by the 
equivalence (3) and its algebraic version given by (6), can be expressed by the matrix 
equation  
 
)]Q(ValN[NecN)Q(ValPos 33=    ,                                              (23) 
 
with Val(Q) representing the truth-value assigned to proposition Q, 
{ }h,n,s)Q(Val ∈ . In addition, in this case the rules of matrix calculus allow us to 
express Aristotle’s postulate as a product between the matrix operators involved: 
 
,                                                                      (24) 
 
an identity not dependent on any particular value of the logical variable. These 
modal operators can be used as a way to represent logical modalities in terms of 
memory modules; for a discussion of the biological situations where these 
representations can be operative see Mizraji (2008). 
 
33 NNecNPos =
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The point of contact with Holmes’ maxim is given by the matrix versions of 
equations (7) and (9): 
 
)]Q(ValN[Nec)Q(ValPosN 33 =                                                   (25) 
 
and  
 
s)Q(ValPosN3 =   .                                                                        (26)       
 
Consequently,  
 
s)]Q(ValN[Nec 3 =   .                                                                     (27) 
 
We can adapt the Axiom of Section 3 to this context by writing 
 
3N Val(Q) Val (Negation Q)= .                                                          (28) 
 
Note that Q is not a vector-matrix variable and we cannot apply the matrix negation 
on it. Instead, Negation Q is a proposition with a vector truth-valuation 
Val(Negation Q). Under this condition, equation (18) can be restated as 
 
3N Pos Val(Q) Nec[Val (Negation Q)] s= =  .                                   (29) 
 
This is a way to express that the impossibility of a proposition is equivalent to the 
necessity of the complement of that proposition. This result establishes a close 
contact with Holmes’ maxim.  
 
Obviously, equation (27) implies an extremely simple fact: Val (Negation Q) = s.  As 
we mentioned previously, this seems a trivial conclusion, but it can be the result of a 
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non-trivial process that was capable of eliminating uncertainty and of converging to 
this assertion. In fact, the valuation represented by Val(Q) (or Val(Negation Q)) 
involves a neural substrate apt to sustain the very complex cognitive process 
required to diagnose the truth-value of a proposition. 
 
Equation (27) helps us to put the modal logical apparatus in terms of neural models, 
and to provide a new point of view to approach the spontaneous understanding that 
we feel when we are confronted with Holmes’ old maxim. But this formalism does 
not consider any probabilistic evaluation of propositions, except the global 
assignment of uncertainties via the inclusion of a third truth-value. In the next 
Section, we are going to connect the previous matrix-logical approach with matrix 
models for associative memories capable of sustaining probabilistic operations. 
 
It is easy to see that the matrix logical operations of this Section are particular cases 
of the Anderson-Kohonen distributed memories. In equation (25) Holmes’ maxim is 
represented using modal logical operators and truth-evaluations expressed with a 
matrix-vector formalism. These logical operators are interpretable as memory 
modules that integrate a modular network (in fact a network of networks, because 
each one of the logical modules is by itself a neural network).  
 
4.3 Guessing probabilities from “Neuro-Logic” 
Many decisions are taken in the presence of uncertainty. These decisions usually rely 
heavily on modal operations. The decision adopted out of a group of choices must 
take into account a set of evaluations about possibilities. For instance, a gambler 
may say, ‘I play roulette if I believe it is possible to win’, and by gambling the risk-
taker intentionally ignores the mathematical odds against winning. Considering this 
propensity, it is natural that Holmes’ maxim was embedded in its modal frame.  
 
 21 
However, Conan Doyle enlarges and refines this frame including a subjective 
probabilistic evaluation: “whatever remains, however improbable”. Probability is a 
well defined mathematical construct (see Feller 1968) and an interesting open 
problem is the accuracy of subjective estimations of a probability (for an important 
analysis of this point, see Pearl 2000). Nevertheless, we are continuously guessing 
probabilities, using a lot of accessible databases that help us to roughly estimate 
frequencies. Probability as a mathematical construct is one of the basis of the 
Bayesian explanation for Holmes’ maxim sketched in Section 2, where the a priori 
probabilities involved are subjective guesses. How to deal with such probabilistic 
guesses in a logical theory? Many theoretical approaches connecting logic and 
probability have been published (e.g. Boole 1854, Keynes 1921) and these approaches 
have been connected with the problems of plausible reasoning (in particular by 
Polya 1990).  
 
The neural models of logical operators have the potentiality to permit two different 
ways for the computation of the logical modalities. One way has been described in 
Section 4.2, with uncertainty “conceptualized” by a specific vector h. The other way 
is based on a recursive approach to logical modalities. We are going to adopt the 
vector-logic formalism to establish a connection with cognitive estimated 
probabilities and the recursive modal logic formalism. In the framework of this 
“neuro-logic”, a way of introducing a probability guess in the logical formalism is to 
assign a numerical weight to the truth-value of an uncertain proposition. For 
instance, somebody can enunciate the proposition “giving the clouds I am seeing, and 
the direction of the wind, I can forecast rain for the next two hours” and based on my 
own experience about weather (i.e.: screening the databases installed in my memory 
modules), I can establish that such a proposition has an 80 % of probability of being 
true. This assignment (obviously not a probabilistic measure but a conjecture) in 
some way touches probability theory because it implies that the complementary 
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situation (no rain) has a conjectural probability of 20 %. In the framework of the 
vector formalism that procedure can be modeled assuming that  
 
Val(Q) = s nα + β ,    , [0,1] , 1α β∈ α +β =  ,                                            (30)   
 
s and n being the vector truth-values defined in Section 4.2. 
  
Let us recall how inside the algebraic logic, recursive processes based on disjunction 
and conjunction (see Blanché 1968) can define the classical modalities. In this 
abstract approach, it is assumed the existence of an infinite set Q of propositions iQ . 
This set can be mapped on a set of binary evaluations ,...}q,...,q,q{ n21  , with 
}f,t{)Q(Valq ii ∈= . The proposition “Q is possible”, ( )Q◊ , can be symbolically 
represented by 
 
(Q) q q .... q ....1 2 n◊ = ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨  , 
 
that is an informal representation of the recursive process  
 
(Q) q (Q)n 1 n 1 n◊ = ∨ ◊+ +   n = 1, 2, ...                              (31)   
 
with (Q) q1 1◊ = . In this process, the possibility (Q)◊  is the limit of (Q)n◊ for 
∞→n . The symbol ∨  represents the dyadic disjunction.  
 
In this formalism, the necessity is defined as follows. The proposition “Q is 
necessary”, (Q)□ , can be represented using a concatenated conjunction ∧  , 
 
(Q) q q .... q ....1 2 n= ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧□ ,                           
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or by the limit for ∞→n  of the recursive process 
 
(Q) q (Q)n 1 n 1 n= ∧+ +□ □   ,  n = 1, 2, ...                                                    (32) 
 
with (Q) q1 1=□  . 
 
It is important to mention that these recursive processes reported in Mizraji (2008) 
using a matrix-vector formalism, were originally implemented by McCulloch and 
Pitts (1943) with formal neurons capable of executing OR and AND. Obviously, in 
the context of any neural model that pretends to describe a physical reality, 
recursions become finite. The formalism described in the previous section allows to 
represent these recursions using the conjunction and disjunction matrices (17) and 
(18) . Let Nec (Q) describe a neural system that recursively evaluates possibilities 
exploring the information stored in a finite set { }iQ  of propositions evaluated by 
vector truth-values )Q(Valu ii = . The matrix version of this process is as follows: 
 
])u[Posu(D]u[Pos n1n21n ⊗= ++                                                           (33) 
 
with 11 u]u[Pos = , in general being ]1,0[,n)1(su iiii ∈αα−+α= . If we project this 
recursive process on vector s (the projection of a vector u on s is given by the scalar 
product usT ) we obtain some interesting results. The scalar projection of 
]u[Poslim]u[Pos n
n ∞→
=  is given by the product 
 
…)1)(1)(1(1]u[Poss 321T α−α−α−−=  .                                           (34) 
 
For a large number of data stored in a memory, this product can be approximated by 
a quasi-infinite recursion, and interpreted as a geometrical mean expression: 
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T n
n
s Pos [u] lim [1 (1 ) ]
→∞
≈ − − α  .                                                       (35) 
 
Consequently 
 
T 0 iff 0s Pos[u]
1 iff 0
α =
≈ 
α ≠
  . 
 
For the necessity operation, the matrix version is: 
 
])u[Necu(C]u[Nec n1n21n ⊗= ++                                                     (36) 
 
with 11 u]u[Nec =  ( ]1,0[,n)1(su iiii ∈αα−+α= ). Using the previous quasi-infinite 
approximation, the scalar projection of ]u[Neclim]u[Nec n
n ∞→
=  gives the product 
 
…321
T ]u[Necs ααα=                                                                       (37) 
 
Note that, due to the fact that u is the result of a recursive process, we have the 
following result: 
 
T
2 1 2 3 1 2 3s Nec[N u] (1 )(1 )(1 )...= − α − α − α = β β β …           (38) 
 
This recursion can be averaged using the limit geometrical mean  
 
T n
n
s Nec[u] lim
→∞
≈ α  .                                                                   (39) 
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that gives the classical scalar expression for the necessity 
 
T 0 iff 1s Nec[u]
1 iff 1
α ≠
≈ 
α =
  . 
 
Note that these modal operators calculated from two valued operators, but with 
“probabilistic” truth-values given by equation (30), satisfy the theorem:  
 
]uN[NecN]u[Pos 22= .                                                                  (40) 
 
A version of equation (8) is given by 
 
s]uN[Nec]u[PosN 22 ==  ,                                                          (41) 
 
that gives us another formal “neuro-logical” version of Holmes’ maxim, but now with 
the possibility of establishing contact with subjective probabilities (obviously only 
estimated probabilities from the mathematical point of view). 
 
Remark that, in the scheme of this section, a research process implies the existence 
of a fact F that must be explained from a potential set of causes { }iQQ = . We can 
assume that a priori highly improbable causes do not belong to Q; consequently, 
they belong to the complement or negation of Q, that we represent symbolically by 
Negation Q. Remark that the elements of the set Q are not necessarily unlinked nor 
exhaustive: (a) they can be linked and (b) they are not exhaustive. Concerning (a), 
they can be linked because if, for instance, 3Q  represents the name of a possible 
guilty of a crime (say Jean) then 7Q  (say Jacques) can be the name of the same 
criminal (Jean-Jacques) or the name of his associate, both corresponding to the 
 26 
searched cause. Concerning (b), we mention that in general we may expect that 
∑ ≠
i
i 1)Q(obPr . The assumption here is that  
 
1,]1,0[,,ns)Q(Val iiiiiii =β+α∈βαβ+α= .                                        (42) 
                                      
Hence, 1)Q(obPr ii ≤α=  . This is the only assumption concerning probabilities. It 
implies a kind of conservation inside the judgment (conservation mapped in the 
complementarity of assigned probabilities for the two canonical truth-values s and n, 
and in turn supported by the complementarity of the associated conceptual sets 
(Mizraji and Lin 2011)). In this work we will leave as an open problem the link 
between these “cognitive probabilities” and the formal probabilities involved in the 
Bayesian treatment illustrated in Section 2.  
 
Using equation (41) we can now establish a modal-probabilistic version of Holmes’ 
maxim. Let us rewrite this equation as follows: 
 
]eN[Nec]e[PosN 22 = ,                                                                    (43) 
 
with e being a composed event described by a vector. This vector e emerges from the 
recursive process triggered by the search of evidences (evidences obtained from 
previous knowledge of the researcher or from fresh data coming from the external 
reality). We define the link between modalities and the corresponding binary 
probabilities as follows: 
 
TProb(u) s Nec[u]=  
 
For the modal evaluation describing Holmes’ maxim, we have 
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.1)eN(obPrs]eN[Nec
0)e(obPrs]e[PosN
22
2
=⇒=
=⇒=
 
 
This is the final point of our neural version of Holmes’ old maxim. According to 
equation (38), we have 
T
2s Nec[N e] =  1 2 3(1 )(1 )(1 )...− α − α − α =  1 2 3β β β … , 
then 2Pr ob(N e) 1= implies i,1i ∀=β . This very simple conclusion indicates that, 
even if the pre-judged probabilities *iβ were very small, the a posteriori result, after a 
research process showing the events ie to be impossible, induces the necessity of the 
complementary events and rise their probability to 1i =β .  
 
 
5. Discussion 
From the very beginning of the mathematical theory of neuronal networks, the 
relation between logical reasoning and its neuronal bases has been a subject of 
primordial interest. The pioneering work by McCulloch and Pitts (1943) shows how 
some basic logical gates as NOT, AND and OR can be represented on the basis of 
binary neuronal elements by adjusting the thresholds and the synaptic weights of 
these formal neurons; other gates (e.g.: XOR) required a small network to be 
computed. In addition, McCulloch and Pitts showed that modalities ◊  and □  could 
be computed with recurrent networks based on the neuronal gates OR and AND 
respectively. These McCulloch-Pitts “logical neurons” had strong influence in the 
very important works published by Kleene (1951) and von Neumann (1956). Recently, 
the investigation of the links between reasoning and neural models acquired a new 
impulse and new perspectives promoted in part from the advances in cognitive 
sciences and the interest in neural computations. Between these new approaches, we 
want to mention the panoramic contribution of Stenning and van Lambalgen (2008, 
in particular Chapter 8) linking logic, cognition and biological evolution, and the 
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investigations of d’Avila Garcez, Lamb and Gabbay concerning the representation by 
artificial neural networks of a variety of symbolic logical processes, including 
modalities and temporal logic (d’Avila Garcez 2007, d’Avila Garcez, Lamb and 
Gabbay 2009).  
 
In the present work, we opted to use models based on Anderson-Kohonen matrix 
memories, where the logical computations are performed by networks of 
interconnected matrix modules (Mizraji and Lin 2011). In turn, each modular unit is 
composed by a large set of interconnected neurons represented by high dimensional 
matrices and can be programmed or instructed via a learning algorithm (eg: 
Widrow-Hoff algorithm, see Anderson 1995, chapter 9). This kind of matrix models 
present many aspects that enhance their biological plausibility (a point analyzed 
with detail in Anderson 1995), including their reliability in the presence of failures, 
their ability to create statistical averages from their learned inputs (interpretable as a 
source of conceptualizations, see Cooper 1974), and also their capacity to sustain 
logical gates and to display many-valued logics in the presence of uncertain data. It 
is now important to challenge these models with interesting problems linked with 
natural neural computations (“natural” in the sense that an adult human brain with 
a normal education and linguistic performances can do these computations).  The 
Holmes’ old maxim is one of these challenges and we think that these models 
provide interesting answers.  
 
Using the neural-inspired logical formalism (Mizraji 2008 and Mizraji and Lin 2011), 
we showed in equation (29) how Holmes’ maxim is represented using modal logical 
operators and how truth-evaluations are expressed with a matrix-vector formalism. 
As was previously mentioned, these logical operators are interpretable as memory 
modules that integrate a modular network (in fact a network of networks, because 
each one of the logical modules is by itself a neural network). The final point of our 
argument, equation (43), involves the matrices Nec,Pos,N2  and the vector e. The 
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matrix operations implement the abstract algebraic relationships constructed in 
order to formalize a basic modal logic, using the Boolean theoretical framework. 
Clearly, these operators are simplified models of biological neural devices. In this 
formalism, vectors are the ‘stuff cognitive decisions are made on’ inside the neural 
realm. Obviously, if mathematical approach helps us to explain our cognitive 
acceptability of Holmes’ maxim, but on the other hand mathematics itself (being a 
cognitive construction) remains unexplained, then our eventual explanation can be 
considered incomplete and provisional, a flaw that we accept as a transitory step in 
our understanding of this kind of problem. We want to mention that many of the 
modern works concerning the neural representation of reasoning, emphasizes the 
need of nonmonotonic logics capable to deal with adaptive planning (see Stenning 
and van Lambalgen 2008).  In Section 4.3 we saw how in our neural representation of 
Holmes’ maxim, all the process –even if it is guided by the framework of modal logic 
truth-functionality – is dependent on the adaptive evaluations of probabilities. We 
can ask if, formally, this process represents a class of nonmonotonic reasoning (as 
described for instance in d’Avila Garcez, Lamb and Gabbay 2009, Chapter 2) but we 
do not have still a clear answer. Surely the possibility to formalize this process as a 
nonmonotonic logic is an issue that deserves further exploration.  
 
The argument developed in this work suggests that we accept Holmes’ maxim as 
true because our brains are capable to activate neural modules able to perform 
modal logical computations. Our formal approach is neutral in the debate about the 
“Nature versus Nurture” origin of our logical abilities: these neural logical modules 
can be the result of a genetically coded ontogenetic process, or, on the contrary, they 
can be the result of a learning process occurring in a particular cultural environment 
(for a discussion of this point, see Mizraji and Lin 2011).  We argue that the 
spontaneous computation involved in the understanding of Holmes’ maxim is only 
one example among many others; all of them emerging from a natural biological 
design that obviously includes our cognitive brains, together with our sensory and 
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motor systems. In fact, language uses some computational codes that trigger 
complex cognitive procedures. For instance, a preposition like “in” can induce the 
brain to represent a complex spatial relationship between an object and a container. 
Prepositions and logical words are crucial linguistic constructions that can act as 
passwords that give access to sophisticated neurocomputational operations.  
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APPENDIX 1. 
Sherlock Holmes’ old maxim. 
We transcribe three well-known versions of Holmes’ maxim (Doyle, Penguin Edition 
1981). In “The Adventure of the Beryl Coronet”, Holmes says: “It is an old maxim of 
mine that when you have excluded the impossible, whatever remains, however 
improbable, must be the truth”. 
 
Another version is in the novel “The Sign of Four” where Holmes says to Dr. Watson: 
“How often I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever 
remains, however improbable, must be the truth?”. 
 
The last version we want to reproduce here is the one included in “The Adventure of 
the Bruce-Partington Plans”, where Holmes comments: “We must fall back upon the 
old maxim that when all other contingencies fail, whatever remains, however 
improbable, must be the truth”. 
 
APPENDIX 2 
Kronecker Product (Graham 1981). 
For the matrices m nijA a R × = ∈   and 
p q
ijB b R × = ∈  , the Kronecker product is a 
matrix mp nqA B R ×⊗ ∈  defined by 
 
ijA B a B ⊗ =   . 
 
Some important properties of the Kronecker product are the following: 
 
A1.   (A A ') (B B') A B A B' A ' B A ' B'+ ⊗ + = ⊗ + ⊗ + ⊗ + ⊗  
A2.  T T T(A B) A B⊗ = ⊗  
A3.  (A B)(A ' B') (AA ') (BB')⊗ ⊗ = ⊗  
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